In “The problem of global justice” Thomas Nagel argues that global justice is not a problem for a world like ours where sovereignty is parcelled out in states. I disagree. The world is governed from many capitals but indivisible in its injustice. When I consider it from a philosophical position much like Nagel’s I have to hope precisely for justice to put it right.

I

Say that two people are in the justice relation if the allocation of goods across them is just or if it is unjust. Which pairs of people are in the justice relation? This is a question about justice’s scope. Nagel answers that two people are in this relation only if they belong to the same state; he shares it with the New Yorker who irons his shirt but not with the Brazilian who grows his coffee. (p. 141) Behind this question of scope there’s the deeper issue of justice's ground. Which features of the situations of two people in the justice relation account for that relation by giving rise to considerations of justice? The question is deeper because nothing less than a theory of justice can answer it.

A situation in which a person can choose among several allocations of good things is an allocation problem. Your decisions about allocation problems can be held to various standards. You might think, for example, that people have claims to things which fairness requires you to honor by acting for allocations that satisfy them. Or that your concern for people’s wellbeing recommends that you aim for particular patterns of wellbeing put out by particular goods allocations. On an allocative conception of justice, justice is fundamentally a standard for evaluating people’s responses to allocation problems. These problems materialize wherever you notice the possibility of adding to or subtracting from people’s holdings of goods. To see the point of living up to that standard, you don’t need to know how the problems came about nor how the different allocations attainable in them are to be produced. Justice, being germain to every problem, covers the choice of an allocation for all the people whose holdings are within our reach. To limit justice so that it falls short of regulating this problem would require an argument. Until an argument arrives we should apply it to the global choice of one big allocation.

An associative conception of justice takes it to be a standard for evaluating histories of people’s interaction. Interaction of specific kinds gives rise to unusual moral demands which are partly met by ensuring that the interaction tends to generate special distributions of goods. But those demands do not reduce to the demand that people respond well to an allocation problem.

Though the distinction between allocative and associative outlooks is not logically exhaustive, every familiar view of egalitarian distributive justice falls under one of these heads. The allocative conception refuses the claim that the justice relation supervenes on co-membership in states. So that claim will find support, if anywhere and if not from some unfamiliar or nonegalitarian view, from a view within the associative conception.

Nagel derives it from one version of that outlook. On Nagel’s political conception, membership in a state establishes moral demands that are partly met by using state policy to promote certain allocations, and justice is fundamentally a standard for evaluating how
people answer the demands to which membership in the state exposes them. (p. 120)
Nagel sets against this a cosmopolitan conception for which “the demands of justice derive from an equal concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings, and the institutions to which standards of justice can be applied are instruments for the fulfillment of that duty.” (p. 119)

This distinction between cosmopolitan and political outlooks is not only logically nonexhaustive; it excludes a view with well-known actual defenders. Some people who think that demands of justice arise from a special context of interaction rather than from the bare technological feasibility of passing goods around deny that this context is contained within states. For example some people think that international trade, investment, and migration are governed by a world basic structure that is unjust because it fails to satisfy Rawls’ difference principle, and that the world distribution of goods holdings is unjust because it’s the creature of this unjust world basic structure.

Nagel handles this Young Rawlsian view in a couple of mutually incompatible and individually questionable ways. He first mentions two world-basic-structure thinkers, Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz, as exponents of the cosmopolitan conception. (p. 119) But Pogge and Beitz have argued for redistribution on a world scale as an obligation incurred in institutionally routinized interaction and not as the preinstitutional requirement of equal concern or fairness. The mistake is possibly explained by recalling that, outside Nagel’s article, “cosmopolitanism” names not a view of justice’s ground that makes it preinstitutional but a view of justice’s scope that has it reaching across the boundaries of states.

Later Nagel attributes to Beitz and to Brian Barry the proposal that the political conception calls for redistribution across states when the members of different states are joined by the right sort of interactive interdependence. (p. 137) But if the political conception grounds the justice relation in the moral demands arising from co-membership in a state, international interdependence is flatly irrelevant to justice so conceived, and this Beitz-Barry proposal can’t get started.

To be sure of an interesting disagreement, we should make this a disagreement about the best way to develop the associative conception. That will be my topic. I will argue that on its best development the members of different states are in the justice relation if their interaction links them densely enough. Nagel is right about the shirt but wrong about the coffee.

II
Allocative justice is not the sort of thing that you should try to explain in terms of other considerations or a special context. That people face allocation problems and that they must answer to allocative standards are primitives of our ethical thinking. But in taking up the associative conception, Nagel and I assume a burden of explaining the strong and unusual requirements of distributive justice. Nagel wants to account for them as obligations arising from membership in a state, and I’ll argue that he’s looking for explanations in the wrong place.

What is special about sharing a state with other people? Nagel emphasizes two aspects of that relation. The members of a state are subject to the same coercively imposed rules, involuntary terms of association that no one can alter acting on her own and that each can escape only by quitting the country. But those terms are also put forward “in the name”
of each member, each is regarded as their “putative joint author”, and they “actively engage” each member’s will. (pp. 128-9)

These ideas about the active engagement of wills are explained here:

The society makes us responsible for its acts, which are taken in our name and on which, in a democracy, we may even have some influence; and it holds us responsible for obeying its laws and conforming to its norms, thereby supporting the institutions through which advantages and disadvantages are created and distributed. Insofar as those institutions admit arbitrary inequalities, we are, even though the responsibility has been simply handed to us, responsible, and we therefore have standing to ask why we should accept them. This request for justification has moral weight even if we have in practice no choice but to live under the existing regime. The reason is that its requirements claim our active cooperation, and this cannot be legitimately done without justification—otherwise it is pure coercion.

The required active engagement of the will of each member of the society in its operation is crucial. It is not enough to appeal to the material effects that the system imposes on its members. The immigration policies of one country may impose large effects on the lives of those living in other countries ... [But those policies] are simply enforced against the nationals of other states; the laws are not imposed in their name, nor are they asked to accept and uphold those laws. Since no acceptance is demanded of them, no justification is required that explains why they should accept such discriminatory policies, or why their interests should be given equal consideration. (pp. 129-30)

So Nagel thinks that sovereign authorities are the focus of special demands because their subjects are asked to accept the terms of social life that they impose. This is a very old idea, but it never hurts to have another look.

For these purposes we can say that a person accepts her society’s terms if she believes that she has a specifically moral reason to conform to them. And to uphold the terms is to conform to them by acting on this reason. In the right sort of society this reason need not reduce to the consideration that the terms coincide with independent moral requirements that she recognizes. It can also involve her belief that the terms have been chosen for the purpose of regulating her interactions with others and that they have been selected by procedures or have passed some substantive tests that give them force over this.

If I aim to bring it about that you uphold the society’s terms—conforming to them because you accept them—I should try to make sure that you really can accept them. When I take this attitude toward you, I give you standing, as Nagel says, to ask for a justification of the terms I’m imposing on you.

Strangely enough I seem to be able to cancel this obligation just by adjusting my attitude. If I aim only to coerce you into conforming to the terms—if I don’t intend to lead you to accept them—then I no longer owe a reason for accepting them. Or at least this follows from a literal interpretation of Nagel’s claim that where “no acceptance is demanded..., no justification is required”. So we need another interpretation.

One possibility is to condition this obligation, not on the attitude of the authorities, but on the stance of the governed. Suppose I know that you believe that you should conform to the whole complex of the society’s terms because of their role in regulating your
interaction with others. Then when I introduce a new term I knowingly bring it about that you uphold it, and it perhaps follows that I should make sure that you can accept it.

This is familiar, I think. It’s a consideration of the kind that stops me from adding off-message content—sexual boasts, pet theories about the Kennedy assassination—to a birthday card that you’ve signed because you want to wish someone a happy birthday. Just as your name on the card gives you a veto over what is written there, a person’s prior inclination to accept her society’s terms implies that the term setters should strive to make each of them truly acceptable to her.

There is a disanalogy, though, in the fact that this inclination of yours is only conditional. You are a reasoner. You will accept terms only if they go on being acceptable. If I now coerce you into conforming without supplying this justification, you may decide that you don’t accept the terms, and then your act of conformity will not be an act of upholding them. Your social life is less like a card that you’ve already signed and more like a card that you plan to sign if you agree with what it says. And it doesn’t help to point out that, unlike a prospective signer of the card, the coerced conformer has no choice but to conform. That is true but irrelevant, since a reasoner cannot be coerced into accepting something that she sees no reason to accept. This seems to show that I can coerce your conformity to the terms while anticipating that you won’t accept them and hence without triggering the demand that I justify them to you.

There are ways around these complications, I’m sure. But let me also mention an alternative. You might just suppose that an unconditional justificatory burden attaches to every act of coercion by which someone tries to impose terms of interaction on others. In the course of their social life people set out to impose terms, and imposing them is wrong unless they can be justified to the people on whom they’re imposed.

III
Here, then, is how I read Nagel’s abstract proposal about justice. Let’s say that a group of people is proto-legitimate if the people who set terms for these people’s interaction have a duty to make certain that every member can accept them. To submit terms to standards of justice is fundamentally a way of acting on that duty. If we accept this proposal, we can determine a scope for justice by finding out which groups of people form proto-legitimate societies. Nagel’s view is that all and only the co-members of a state have this status.

The last section turned up two strategies for deciding which groups are proto-legitimate. You might claim, first, that a society is proto-legitimate if its members regard its terms as having moral force over their interactions. This attitude on the part of the subjects creates a duty on the part of the authorities to produce genuine justifications of the terms. When term setters act on this duty, they give people reason to go on regarding the terms as having moral force over their activity. So they make it the case that the society remains proto-legitimate. The proto-legitimacy of a society is a sort of equilibrium condition; it creates requirements whose satisfaction reproduces the fact of proto-legitimacy.

The second idea is just to notice that people are in fact coercively imposing terms on others, that imposed terms call for justification, and that the targeted domains of interaction must therefore be regarded as zones of proto-legitimacy.

In the next section I’ll argue that neither approach can support Nagel’s association of proto-legitimate societies with states. But I should first mention that my account of the Nagel passage has left out another important idea. This is that a member of a
proto-legitimate society helps to impose the society’s terms on others just by conforming to them. Thus Nagel writes that in “obeying its laws and conforming to its norms” we are “supporting the institutions through which advantages and disadvantages are created and distributed,” and that this support for the institutions makes us responsible for them.

Suppose this further claim were true. Then each person is not only the object but the subject of the imposition of a proto-legitimate society’s terms. Each person’s action invites the demand that she be able to justify those terms to every other member even as their imposition on her own activity makes her the source of a similar demand for justification. It’s an old and profound theme of Nagel’s writing on equality that this sort of a totally connected network of pairwise justificatory demands that run in two directions is the home ground of a strong form of equal consideration of others’ interests that leads to egalitarian justice.⁴

My plan is to refute Nagel’s internalization of proto-legitimacy in states, and I think I can do this without touching the further claim. I mention it because the alternative I’ll go on to sketch makes a somewhat different use of this image of justification that points in all directions.

IV

Why suppose that the demands of proto-legitimacy are appropriate to all and only societies bounded by states? To answer we have to choose between the two maps of proto-legitimacy that I described.

Applying the first approach we look out the window and see which people are now triggering demands for the acceptability of social terms by being disposed to accept them. Nagel’s claim about states is in this case a piece of empirical political sociology. It’s the observation that Uzbeki citizens regard Uzbeki institutions as giving them a moral reason to conform, so that Uzbeki policymakers face an obligation to supply this reason.

We don’t need blood on the streets of Andijan to wonder whether this founds Nagel’s view on a false sociology. Take the United States. Some people obey its laws in the belief that their political origins and social role endow them with moral force. Many others are just avoiding the costs of breaking the law. Some lawmakers want to make it true that everyone has reason to obey the law apart from those costs. But others have delegated authorship of the law to their unelected campaign donors, with no pretense to a wider justification of what gets passed.⁵ The executive branch has said that it owes me no account of its program for the secret and indefinite detention of people it accuses of involvement in terrorism. Are these detentions effected in my name? Do I have standing to question them? It’s hard to tell, on the current strategy. On the current strategy we can’t establish that the authorities have a duty to produce justifications of their policy until we establish that people’s conformity to the policy indicates an acceptance of it. The present map shows a second equilibrium where each nonmoral stance toward terms—an unaccepting conformity to them and a nakedly coercive imposition of them—licenses the other. If the US is in this morally neutral equilibrium and not in the morally excited equilibrium of proto-legitimacy, Nagel’s view implies that standards of justice don’t cover it. But the distribution of goods in this society is unjust.

Maybe this is too cynical a picture of 2005. So consider that there’s no respect in which the laws of the antebellum United States can be said to have been enacted in the name of the slaves. The slaves had no moral reason to play their legally assigned parts in the institution of slavery, and since only slaves and a few abolitionists regarded the slaves as
moral actors, whips and hunger were anyway substituted for normative engagement in reconciling the slaves to it. An adequate moral audit of the United States in 1861 would nonetheless reveal not only violations of the slaves’ preinstitutional human rights but also the unjust interaction of slaves and slaveowners in plantation agriculture and the unjust distributions of benefits and burdens that this produced. Rather than making it possible for the first time to criticize the Southern economy as unjust, emancipation and Reconstruction sought to overcome its injustices.

When he considers a similar objection about colonialism, Nagel says that it might be sidestepped by adopting a sufficiently “broad interpretation of what it is for a society to be governed in the name of its members.” (p. 129, n. 14) Forget slavery and colonialism, then, forget my doubts about present-day proto-legitimacy, and consider a hypothetical naked tyranny constructed to fail even the broadest interpretation. A tyrant makes it known that he will disembowel anyone who ignores his command. His peons obey him only because they hope to escape that punishment. But when he takes the entire social surplus for his consumption, leaving only subsistence to the peons, that distribution is not beyond criticism from the point of view of justice. In fact it’s hard to imagine a plainer injustice.

The scope of justice has come out too narrow, excluding states that don’t show up on this map as being proto-legitimate. So let’s try the other map. Let’s suppose that the coercive imposition of terms of interaction can establish proto-legitimacy independently of anyone’s belief that the terms are to be accepted because of their role in governing interaction. We now need to decide which acts of the coercive imposition of terms call for the relevant kind of justification to the people on whom they’re imposed. And Nagel must answer that only the imposition of a state’s policies on members of that state rises to this standard. I don’t see how, confining himself to the second strategy, he can defend that answer.

As Nagel points out, many of the terms of cross-border interaction are coercively imposed by states on foreign nationals. If you try to enter the United States without the right papers, you will be seized and returned to where you lived before. If you hope to distribute anti-retroviral drugs to HIV carriers in your country, you will be deterred by liability in US courts from using formulae patented by US manufacturers. If you want to nationalize your country’s foreign-owned mineral wealth, the long list of occasions on which the US reversed such assertions of sovereignty by overthrowing or disrupting governments that attempted them will dissuade you from risking a similar crisis now. The fact that people born in Brazil continue to interact with Americans as participants in the Brazilian labor market and not the US one, the fact that African doctors interact with US drugmakers in ignorance of the latest medical technology, and the fact that world oil consumers pay rents to multinational oil companies that they might have paid to oil-producing states—these are complicated facts with complicated explanations, but each explanation involves actual and expected acts of coercion by which US policymakers have sought to regulate the terms of interaction worldwide.

Recall what Nagel says about the first example. Because immigration policies are “simply enforced against” foreign nationals and “not imposed in their name”, because would-be immigrants are not “asked to accept and uphold these laws, ... no justification is required that explains why they should accept such discriminatory policies.” Here Nagel appeals squarely to the first map of proto-legitimacy. To find out which acts of coercion require special justification, we ask which ones already tend to be accompanied, in the actual world, by beliefs that the coerced people have reason to act in the imposed ways apart from the fact of their coercion. We look to the actual world to see which sticks of coercion are accompanied by the carrots of a pretended extra-coercive justification.
But this strategy is unacceptable as we don’t accept the conclusion that there’s no
distributive injustice in the hypothetical naked tyranny. On the alternative I’m trying out
now, you can’t simply report that people are disposed only to conform to the policies of
foreign states and not to accept them or that foreign policymakers aren’t claiming
acceptability for them. What we want to know now is whether acceptability is something
that the imposers should claim and that the imposed-on should demand. To answer No we
need a reason for distinguishing cross-state terms from terms internal to states. Since the
scope of proto-legitimacy is not dictated by the empirical incidence of people’s
acknowledgement of it, an argument is required to stop it from taking in the whole world
system of coercively imposed terms.

In holding out for that argument I’m not reverting to the monist position that Nagel
attributes to his cosmopolitans. (p. 122) I am applying rather than rejecting the Rawlsian
home truth that “the correct regulative principle for a thing depends on the nature of the
thing.” When a moral difference between national and international impositions of terms
makes its appearance, we’ll give them their own principles. But that difference is to be
discovered and not assumed; Rawls’ multilayered scheme for ethics has us adding layer to
layer, not in the execution of some prior architecture, but to accommodate our successive
discoveries of the different moral things the world contains.

I’ve supposed with Nagel that proto-legitimacy raises a special moral challenge whose
resolution calls for a strongly egalitarian attention to everyone’s interests. To derive a
scope for justice from this idea, we have to decide which people are involved in this
challenge. If we let the actual patterns of pretended justification and moralized conformity
decide this, we unacceptably exclude relations within frankly illegitimate states. If we
instead require proto-legitimacy to track the coercive imposition of interactive terms, we
have no reason to encapsulate it in states.

V

The second option leads to an associative view of justice on which the justice relation runs
across states as well as within them. We scan the globe for coercively imposed terms, and,
finding some that are international, we subject the whole mass to a single standard. But
this view draws objections of its own.

For one thing it can’t account for the appearance that global justice has become more
important as the world has become more connected. This appearance is part of the
intellectual background to Nagel’s paper though his theory turns out to imply that it’s a
mirage. The importance of global justice has been stable at zero, where it will remain until
a world state emerges to mediate the political conflicts stirred up by economic
internationalization. But the second option leads to the opposite mistake by implying that
global justice has had a constant force from the first time a guard’s arrow stopped an alien
intruder. I want a view for which the salience of global justice is increasing in the density
of interactions across borders.

In granting Nagel’s point that not every act of the coercive imposition of terms on foreign
nationals refers us to the same strong standard of egalitarian justice, I accept the burden
of identifying some variable of world organization that is the source of demands of justice
and whose variation can account for justice’s variable importance. When Nagel considers
the view that “there is a sliding scale of degrees of co-membership in a nested or
sometimes overlapping set of governing institutions” that supports “a corresponding
spectrum of degrees of egalitarian justice,” he objects precisely that he can’t see any such
variable apart from the presence or absence of a state that claims to act in people’s names. (pp. 140-3)

So what’s the missing variable? Nagel points us in the right direction, I think, by speaking of the special burdens that attach to institutions because they actively involve people’s wills. He has in mind that people are asked to accept the institutions. But there is a second way in which institutions can involve each person as an actor, a will, and not merely as their passive beneficiary or victim. Institutions depend for their typical effects on people’s choosing to act in particular ways when they occupy particular places in those institutions. People who aim for specific institutions are aiming to make particularly placed people take actions whose consequences they favor. Viewed from the perspective of the people who make them, institutions are primarily devices by which they can direct other people to serve their purposes.

And the thing to notice is that you shouldn’t use other people by directing their action to your benefit unless you can show that the resulting sequence of actions and results is something they themselves have reason to want to come about. If that’s right, this business of getting other people to act for your purposes is an independently plausible occasion for the special justificatory demands that eventually carry us to an equal consideration of other people’s interests.7

I’ve argued this out before, and I won’t repeat the argument except in a short sketch.8 There are various projects by which you can direct other people to advance your interests. Some are fleeting and self-contained. When someone is approaching you on a crowded sidewalk you might step to your left so that she will step to your right, allowing you to pass. Others last longer and are more encompassing. Projects by which you try to get ahead by altering the typical products over time of an entire network of social interaction require justification to the representative occupant of each typical position in that network. For the most ambitious projects whose effects take in all positions, this means justification to everyone.

Say that I am in the relation $R$ to you if I face projects for advancing my interests by reshaping the network to redirect the action of people in your position. And consider a group of people that is closed under $R$—everyone bears this relation only to other members of the group—and for which $R$ is complete—every member bears it to every other member. I’ll make but can’t defend here four claims about this situation. First, each person should adopt a policy for choosing among her projects. Second, the completeness of $R$ means that everyone must be able to justify her policy to every other member in light of the fact that everyone else is seeking a justifiable policy. Third, since everyone who contemplates these projects is regarding the sum of her interactions with others as a device for producing goods for herself, a policy that everyone can accept with respect to the resulting distributions of goods is indeed acceptable to everyone. The fourth claim comes from Nagel’s article on “Equality.” He showed there that the Rawlsian goal of maximizing the minimum goods position can be explained as a way of approximating unanimity when it happens that no goods distribution is acceptable to everyone outright because each person wants more requiring others to have less.9 Since everyone can agree that a distribution is at least as acceptable as it is to the worst-off person, people come closest to outright unanimity by maximizing that level of acceptability.10 If this establishes an obligation to carry out the difference principle, the obligation relates all and only the members of any group for which $R$ is closed and complete.

Coming back to the world, we have to distinguish three structures for it. The world might decompose into a series of societies such that $R$ is closed and complete for each society. In
choosing among her projects, here, a person triggers the considerations of the previous paragraph with respect to every other member of her society, and no one else is involved. Each society is a Nagel-style totally connected graph of two-way demands for justification, and the justice relation holds between all and only its members.

In a second possible organization, R is complete with respect to the world itself. The same reasoning shows that the justice relation applies to every pair of people in the world.

In a third, intermediate case, the world fails to fall apart into mutually unconnected subnetworks, but R is not yet complete. You can’t find a group of people, smaller than the whole world, whose members’ projects affect only the positions of other members. But neither is it true that everyone faces a project for affecting the action taken at every other position. What’s confusing about this pattern is that we can’t strictly apply it to the reasoning that establishes the difference principle in the first two cases since it lacks their shared feature of the closure and completeness of R.

VI

I believe that capitalist economic development and its politically concerted internationalization have carried us out of the first structure but have not yet delivered us to the second. We are somewhere between them, in a world of that confusing intermediate kind.

The new material interdependence inspires new projects for shaping outsiders’ action to insiders’ purposes, and these projects intrude on formerly inward-looking domains of policy and association. Again consider Nagel’s example of immigration. It was once possible to describe controls on immigration as a way of insulating citizens from interaction with the people they kept out. But trade and investment with the migrants’ home countries mean that interaction is now an accomplished fact. Border policy decides only the form that it will take. A Mexican worker is either sent back to produce my consumption goods as a member of the Mexican workforce employed by firms that export to the US, or she is allowed to work here as Nagel’s fellow New Yorker. (Anyone who doubts that immigration policy is fine-tuned with these alternatives in mind should take a look at who lobbies for and against proposals to liberalize the inflow of alien labor.) A more obvious example is the ever more explicit dedication of diplomacy and other “high politics” to the service of externally oriented commercial interests. When those interests press for a geopolitical strategy that favors a weaker or a stronger yuan, or the suppression or permission of trade union activity among Chinese workers, they are trying to secure specific terms of trade, specific patterns of interaction, with people who live in China. And these projects are to an imperfect extent mirrored in Mexican and Chinese projects for recruiting Nagel and me to Mexican and Chinese purposes.

But the circle is far from being closed. The material entanglement that provides those projects with their motives and devices is far from complete. So the relation R remains incomplete, too.

Three ways of living out this interregnum occur to me. We could decide, crazily, that neither of the standards I described before—neither a society-by-society application of the difference principle nor a global one—has force. We could decide that we are to switch standards when we pass a critical point in some measure of connectivity. That’s less crazy but hopelessly Sorites-prone. Or we could answer to a mixture of the two standards, shifting weight toward the global one as ties between formerly self-contained societies multiply and deepen. The rationale for this third attitude is avowedly constructive. We
find the world on a path that is transforming it from a clearly appropriate object of the first standard into a clearly appropriate object of the second. We don’t know where to draw the line between these two conditions. And so we act to register the changes in our circumstances with a continuous revision of our approach to them.

Nagel is likely to find this arbitrary, but we should distinguish two versions of the charge of arbitrariness. Any concrete representation of this continuous strategy in a particular objective function will be arbitrary in the sense that we could think of other functions that would represent it just as well. But Nagel’s more serious charge of arbitrariness is that the slide is not controlled by any morally interesting variable. And I hope to have answered this more serious criticism by explaining the moral significance of the facts that our projects for institutionally manipulating other people used to break down into a series of closed networks and that they are now probably recombining to form a single closed network at the level of the entire world.

If we could make precise the idea of a gradual redistribution of weight between standards, this might be the least bad approach. It matches the equally murky reflective datum with which I began—the appearance that global requirements are becoming more important. It’s a perspective from which they can begin to seem important long before we’ve conjured a world state from the wreckage of our separate efforts to tie down errant fissionable material or stabilize the planet’s temperature. The world does not need a demigod to hold it up, and the demands of world justice are also self-standing.

VII
Lincoln’s war for sovereignty over the South, which became a war for justice within it, serves Nagel as a lesson in the dependence of justice on sovereignty. (p. 146) I see a different lesson. Lincoln came to office vowing to “hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government” even as he hoped that “the mystic chords of memory” that tied his compatriots to their shared past would “swell the chorus of the Union when touched again ... by the better angels of our nature.” But he was improvising. He would soon relocate the moral purpose of the war in what his order of January 1, 1863 called an “act of justice.”

And what’s justice? I think it’s an angelic disturbance, not of memory’s mystic chords, but of the profane bonds of our actual interdependence. To bring those relations under the control of a practical political morality, now that they extend around the world, calls for an enormous expansion in the acknowledged scope of justice. A pessimist in many things, Nagel is right to doubt that this change will come soon. The richest people in the world are too powerful, and they have too much to lose. But Lincoln’s example shows that it’s at least possible to discover reasons of justice where we’re used to seeing reasons of state.

Notes


7. Considering the difficulties of stabilizing the scope of proto-legitimacy that I explained in section II—it seemed that the obligations of term setters could be turned on or off depending on the moral description they gave to their own activities—it’s remarkable that the trigger of these demands is not a moral relation at all. The trigger is the fact that you intend to get people to do things, and you can intend this without asking people to accept your impositions on them or otherwise engaging them normatively. Unlike the obligations that Nagel says you incur when you ask people to accept your terms, you can’t cancel this obligation by retreating to a normatively disengaged understanding of what you’re doing. Acceptability is required even where acceptance is not sought.


10. I take this restatement of Nagel’s argument from a remark by Derek Parfit. [Get Parfit’s permission]

11. Could it be something so Procrustean as

$$\max_{i \in A} \alpha \min_{w_i} + (1 - \alpha) \min_{j \in W} w_j$$

with $A$ the set of your fellow citizens, $W$ the set of people in the world, $w_i$ an index of $i$’s goods, and $\alpha$ a parameter decaying from 1 to 0?


5840 words.